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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FEDERAL FARM J\IORTGAGE
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondents,
vs.

VANCE D. WALKER as Administrator of the estate of Gearld C.
Walker, deceased; LEONA W.\
CORBITT; ELVEN WALKER;
LUELLA w. RosKELLEY; MAX
WALKER; HARRY WALKER, by
his guardian ad litem Vance D.
Walker, FIRST DOE; SECOND
DOE; T HI R D D 0 E; and
FOURTH DOE,
Defendants and Appellants.

I

A

}

'

ppe lant S
•

Brief.
Case No. 7211

NEWEL G. DAINES,
L. DELOS DAINES,
Attorneys for Appellants.
STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the Honorable ~1arriner M. Morrison, judge of the District Court of
Judicial
in andprovided
for byCache
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2
of Utah, whereby and wherein on the 6th day of April,
1948, he entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants. ( R. 65-66. )
The plaintiff filed an action on the 19th day of September, 1946, in which it prayed to foreclose a judgment
lien made and entered on the 28th day of September,
1938, against the property of one, Gerald C. Walker, deceased, the judgment debtor. To the complaint, the defendants interposed a general demurrer. Prior to the
Court's ruling on the demurrer, Harry Walker, by his
guardian ad litem, pursuant to an order of the District
Court, filed an answer and cross complaint. To these the
plaintiff interposed a general demurrer. The plaintiff's
complaint was subsequently amended by a separate instrument and defendant, Harry Walker's answer and cross
complaint, were also amended. The trial Court overruled
the defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and sustained the plaintiff's demurrer to defendant, Harry Walker's amended answer and cross complaint on the lOth
day of January, 1948. The defendants elected to stand
on their pleadings, and failed to further plead; their default was entered and from the judgment of the Court the
defendants appeal as above mentioned. (R.0-23.72.)
PLEADINGS
That part of the complaint pertinent to the discussions
is as follows:
That one, Gerald C. Walker, died about the 14th day
of January, 1946, at El Segundo, California. That the
defendant, Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
qualified administrator of his estate. That the other defendants named, except the Doe's, were the children of
the decedent and his sole surviving heirs at law. That
at the date of the decedent's death and since the 7th day
of September, 198.3, or prior thereto, the said decedent
was the 0\Yner in fee of record of certain real property
situated in Cache Count:·, Utah, which it then described.
That on or about the 27th day of September, 1938,
the plaintiff, in foreclosure proceedings wherein the said
decedent was one of the defendants, recovered a judgment against him in the sum of $3,384.07. That the property covered by the mortgage was sold by the Sheriff
at public sale pursuant to the order of the Court, for the
sum of $1823.13. That this amount was credited to the
judgment, leaving a deficiency balance in favor of the
plaintiff and against the decedent in the sum of $1614.77.
That the said sum of $1614.77 nor the interest thereon has
not been paid. That the judgment against the said Gerald C. Walker was duly made and entered on the 27th
day of September, 1938, and that it then and there became
and ever since has been and now is a judgment lien against
the real property described in the complaint. The plaintiff prayed that the judgment be declared a lien upon the
real estate described in its complaint, that it be sold to
satisfy the judgment and the proceeds applied in the payment of the amount due the plaintiff on its judgment, and
that any surplus be paid to the person or persons entitled
thereto, and that the defendants be foreclosed of any interest they had in the premises. ( R.0-3) On the 8th day
of April, 1947, the plaintiff amended its complaint by a
separate instrument, setting forth therein that it waived
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
Iecourse against any and all property, both real and personal, of the estate of said decedent, except that which it
described in paragraphs 2 of its complaint. ( R.9.)

DEMURRER
The defendants on the 9th day of October, 1946, filed
a general demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, setting forth
that it did not state sufficient facts to state a cause of
action. ( R.4. )

AMENDED ANSWER
The defendant, Harry Walker, by his guardian ad
litem, Vance D. Walker, pursuant to an order of the District Court, filed an answer and cross complaint, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:
That the defendant, Harry Walker, was a minor of
the age of twenty years and a resident of Smithfield, Utah,
that Vance D. Walker was his duly appointed and qualified guardian ad litem; admitted all the material allegations of said complaint, except that he denied that the
judgment made and entered on the 27th day of September,
1938, had ever been and that it now is a judgment lien
upon and against the property described in plaintiff's complaint. He futrher alleged that at the time of the death
of Gerald C. Walker, that he was a resident of Smithfield,
Cache County, Utah, the head of a family, that the property sought to be foreclosed by the plaintiff was the only
real estate owned by the decedent at all times mentioned
in plaintiff's complaint, and that it was the decedent's
homestead, and that the said deficiency; judgment never
attached as a lien to said property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
By way of a separate and further answer, the defendant alleged:
That on or about the lOth day of August, 1946, one
Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed administrator
of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, and was the
duly qualified and acting administrator of said estate.
That on or about the 17th day of December, 1946, the administrator filed an inventory and appraisement including
all the property of the said Gerald C. Walker, deceased,
which consisted of the property described in plaintiff's
complaint, together with one share of water stock. That
the property was duly appraised and the value set forth
in the inventory a!!d appraisement was of the sum of
$1,050.00. That the decedent's wife had predeceased him.
That the defendant, Harry Walker, was a minor of nineteen years of age at the date of distribution hereinafter
mentioned, and the only minor child of the decedent. That
on the 28 day of December, 1946, all of the property of
the decedent, Gerald C. Walker, deceased, was distributed
to him by; a decree of summary distribution pursuant to
102-8-2, U.C.A. 1943. That he was a resident of Smithfield Utah, at all times mentioned in plaintiff's complaint,
and that the property was of the value of $1,050.00 and
vested in him as his homestead.
By way of a second separate and further answer, the
defendant alleged:
That if said judgment was ever a lien that it ceased
to be one as it expired on the 28th day of September, 1946.
By way of a third separate and further answer, the
defendant alleged, the material part of this discussion
being:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That the judgment mentioned in plaintiff's complaint was a money judgment and that it has never been
presented for payment to the administrator of the estate
of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, as required by 102-9-16,
U.C.A., 1943.
A~1ENDED

CROSS COlVIPLAINT

The defendant, Harry Walker, by his guardian ad
litem, in his cross complaint set forth tha! the plaintiff
was a corporation, the defendant's infancy, the appointment of the guardian ad litem, and that one Gerald C.
\Valker, deceased, died on the 14th day of January, 1946,
at which time he was a resident of Smithfield, Utah. That
one, Vance D. Walker, was the duly appointed, qualified
and acting administrator of the estate of Gerald C. Walker,
deceased, having been appointed on the lOth day of
August, 1946. That the decedent at the time of his death
was the owner of certain property situated in Cache
County, State of Utah, describing the property, and setting
forth the names of the heirs at law of the decedent, their
ages, and further stating that the defendant at the time
of the decedent's death was nineteen years of age. That
Gerald C. Walker, deceased, at his death, was a widower
and unmarried, and that the defendant, Harry Walker,
was his only minor child. That the property described
in the complaint was inventoried and appraised and the
inventory and appraisement filed in the District Court,
the value of which was the sum of $1050.00. That pursuant to the inventory and appraisement and the petition
of the administrator, the property was distributed by a
decree entered on the 28th day of December, 1946, to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the defendant by the way of summary distribution under
102-8-1 and 2, U.C.A., 1943. That since said date, defendant has been and now is the owner in fee, and that
said property vested in him as a homestead. That on the
28th day of September, 1938, a money judgment, wherein
the plaintiff was the judgment creditor, and the said
Gerald C. Walker was the judgment debtor in the sum
of $1614.77 was duly docketed in the office of the County
Clerk of Cache County, State of Utah in the book of judgments at page 269, and the same remains unsatisfied of
record and constitutes a cloud upon the defendant's title~
That the property described in the cross complaint was
the only real estate owned by the deceased, Gerald C.
Walker, at the time of his death, that he was the head of
a family and that the deficiency judgment never attached
as a lien on said property. He further alleges that if the
judgment was ever a lien, that the same expired and ceased
to be one on the 28th day of September, 1938. That the
plaintiff claimed an interest in the said real estate adverse .
to the defendant and that it was without any right, title
or interest whatsoever. The defendant then prayed that
title to the property be quited in him. ( R.21-24. )
PLAINTIFF'S DEMURRER
The plaintiff filed a general demurrer to defandant's
answer and cross complaint, setting forth that neither the
answer or cross complaint stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
( R.l6. ) Before the demurrer
was ruled on, the defendant, Harry Walker, by his guardian ad litem, filed an amended answer and cross complaint
as aforementioned, to which the plaintiff and defendants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stipulated that plaintiff's demurrer was to be considered
a demurrer to the amended answer and cross complaint.
(R.l7.)
COURT'S RULING
The Court overruled defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the
defendant, Harry C. Walker's amended answer and cross
complaint on the lOth day of January, 1948. The defendants were given ten days after notice in which to further
plead. Notice was given. The defendants, however,
elected to stand on their pleadings. ( R.72.)
The default of the defendants was entered, and the
Court on the 6th day of April, 1948, made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Foreclasure in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. ( R.63-67.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. The Court erred in making and entering its judgment of foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant ( R.66.)
2. The Court erred in entering its Findings of Fact
and conclusions of Law ( R.63-65.)
3. The Court erred in making and entering paragraphs 3 and 6 of Findings of Fact. ( R.63.)
4. The Court erred in making and entering that
part of paragraph one of its Conclusions of law which
reads:
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"and it then and there became, ever since has been
and now is a judgment lien upon and against the real
property hereinbefore specifically described." ( R.65.)
5. The Court erred in 1naking and entering paragraphs 2 and 3, of its Conclusions of Law. ( R.65.)
6. The Court erred in overruling defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs complaint. ( R. 72. )
7. The Court erred in sustaining plaintiffs general
demurrer to the defendant, Harry Walker's amended answer by his guardian at litem. ( R. 72. )
8. The Court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's general demurrer to defendant, Harry Walker's amended
cross complaint by his guardian at litem. ( R. 72. )
ARGUMENT
Assignments of Errors 1 and 8 inclusive can be considered together. The Court erred in overruling the defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs complaint for the
reasons that:
(a) The complaint on its face showed that the plaintiff was attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of
equity to enforce a purported money judgment lien
against a deceased judgment creditor instead of proceeding in the probate court to effect its collection. Further
plaintiff failed to allege that its claim had been presented
to the administrator of the estate of Gerald C. Walker,
deceased, and that it had been denied.
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(b) Secondly, plaintiff's judgment lien, if any, expired and ceased to be a lien on the 28th day fo September, 1946, more than fifteen months prior to the Court's
overruling the defendant's general demurrer and more
than eighteen months before the entry of judgment.
The Court had before it, 101-4-6, U.C.A. 1943, which
provides:
"A homestead as provided by section 1, title Homesteads, together with all personal property exempt
from execution, shall be wholly exempt from the payment of the debts of the decedent, and shall be the
absolute property of the surviving husband or wife
and minor children, or if the minor children in case
there is no surviving husband or wife, or the surviving
husband or wife in case there are no minor children,
to be set apart on petition and notice, at any time
after the return of the inventory."
Also 102-9-4, U.C. 1943, which provides:
"All claims arising upon contract, whether the same
are due, not due or contingent, must be presented
within the time limited in the notice, and any claim
. b arre dforever. 1,'1- 1,'1not presented 1s
!,'!-"

Also 102-9-11, U.C.A. 1943, which provides:
"No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is first presented to the executor or administrator, except that
an action may be brought without notice by any
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holder of a mortgage or lien to enforce the same
against the property of the estate subject thereto,
where all recourse against any other property of the
estate is expressly waived in the complaint; but no
attorney's fees shall be recovered in such action unless such claim is so presented."
Also 102-9-13, which provides:
«If any action is pending against the decedent at the
time of his death, the plaintiff must in like manner
present his claim to the executor or administrator for
allowance or rejection, authenticated as required
in other cases; and no recovery shall be had in the
action unless proof is made of the presentation required."
Also 102-9-16, U.C.A. 1943, which provides:
«When any judgment has beenn rendered for or
against the testator or intestate in his lifetime, no
execution shall issue thereon after his death, except
as provided in the code of civil procedure relating to
executions. Judgment against the decedent for the
recovery of money must be presented to the executor
or administrator like any other claim. If execution
is actually levied upon any property of the decedent
before his death, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale must
account to the executor or adminstrator for any surplus in his hands. A judgment creditor having a
judgment which was rendered against the testator
or intestate in his lifetime may redeem any real estate
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of the decedent from any sale under foreclosure or
execution, in the same manner and with the same effect as if the judgment debtor were still living."
Also 102-9-22 U. C. A., 1943 which provides:
::Other debts of the estate must be paid -in the follworder:
( 1 ) The wages of each employee of the decedent
for services rendered within sixty days next
preceding his death, not exceeding $100.00.
( 2) Debts having preference fy the laws of the
United States or of this State.
( 3) -All debts which are liens upon the real property occupied, selected or set apart as a homestead.
( 4) All other debts which were liens on the property of the decedent at the time of his death.
( 5) All other demands against the estate."
Also 104-37-7 U. C. A., 1943, which provides:
"Notwithstanding the death of a party after the judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or it may be
enforced, as follows:
( 1) In the 'case of the death of the death of the
judment creditor, upon the application of his executor
or administrator, or successor in interest.
( 2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor,
if the judgment is for the recovery of real or personal
property or the enforcement of a lien thereon."
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Also 88-0-1 U. C. A. 1948, which provides:
"A homestead o o o shall be exempt from judgment
lien and from execution or forced sale, except upon
the following obligations: ( 1 ) taxes accruing and
levied thereon; and ( 2) judgments obtained on debts
secured by lawful mortgage on the premises and on
debts created for the purchase price thereof."
A COURT OF EQUITY IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO FORECLOSE A MONEY JUDGMENT LIEN AGAINST A DECEASED JUDG\IENT CREDITOR. HIS REMEDY IS TO PROCEED IN THE PROBATE COURT FOR ITS COLLECTION AFTER ITS PRESENTATION TO AN
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR AND THEIR
DENIAL OF IT.
In determining the question as to whether a court of
equity has jurisdiction to foreclose a money judgment lien,
if any, against a deceased judgment creditor, or whether
the sole jurisdiction in such matters is in the probate court,
after due presentation of a creditors claim, the foregoing
statutes should be considered together.
Although 102-9-11, U.C.A. 1948 provides that "an
action may be brought without notice by a holder of a
mortgage or lien," and without presentation of a claim to
the administrator or executor of an estate, we believe that
its provision regarding the foreclosure of liens are necessarily limited by the provisions of 102-9-16, U. C. A. 1943,
which provides "that judgments against a decedent for
the recovery of money must be presented to the executor
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or administrator like any other claim." Thus a money
judgment is excluded from its provisions and a money
judgment debtor is limited to the probate court for its
collection.
Furthermore it seems that the provisions of 102-9-11
U. C. A. 1943 apply only to those liens which either are
specifically waived by the judgment debtor or are exempt
from the provisions of 38-0-1 U. C. A. 1943, our Homestead Exemption statute. The only exemption under this
statute are " ( 1) taxes accruing and levied thereon; and
( 2) judgments obtained on debts secured by lawful mortgage on the premises and on debts created for the purchase price thereof." If this were not true the provisions
of the probate code which provide for the setting apart of
a probate homestead for the benefit of a surviving spouse
and/or minor children as provided for in 104-4-6 U. C. A.
1943, would be defeated, and again the probate court
would not be able to discharge the preferences established
under 102-9-22 U. C. A. 1943, particularly liens upon the
property set apart as a probate homestead.
Again, if a lien based on a money judgment can be
enforced withuot presentation to the executor er administrator of an estate, its enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity inasmuch as the judgment
creditor has an adequate remedy at law, as in such an
instance :he can proceed by way of execution and sale
'lnder the provisions of Title 104, Chapter 37, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, for its enforcement. 104-37-7, U. C. A.
1943, provides an execution can issue and be enforced
in the case of the death of a judgment debtor "if the judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment is for the recovery of real or personal property, or
the enforcement of a lien." Certainly section 102-9-11 was
not intended by the legislature to give a judgment creditor
in the event of a judgment debtor's death an additional
remedy than that already provided by 104-37-7, U. C. A.
1943, as by its provisions it only purports to set forth in
what instances and under what circumstances an action
may be commenced on a mortgage or lien without notice
or presentation of the claim to the executor or administrator.
This court in the case of Fidelity Guaranty Company
vs. Bletcher, 228 P. 188, 64 Utah 49, held that a
creditor can not have his claim established in a separate
and independent action against an administrator but that
it must have it determined in probate proceedings after
notice to other claimants. The court said:
Nor is it affected in its rights to any extent. The
statute clearly determines the order in which the
claims that are allowed must be paid. The statute
having classified the claims, the court can do no more
than determine the class to which a particularly
claims belongs, and when that is determined, the
order of payments follows as a matter of law. The
plaintiff must therefore assert its alleged preference
in the probate proceedings and give all the other
claimants an opportunity to be heard, respecting
plaintiff's claim. It cannot rush into court and have
that question determined in a separate and independent action against the administrator. After notice to
the several claimants that the plaintiff claims a preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ference and will ask the court to have its claim placed
into the preferred class, the court will be given opportunity to fix a date on which all parties may be
heard with respect to the matter. Upon such hearing,
the court may either allow or disallow, either in whole
or in part, plaintiff's alleged preferential right, and
thereafter any interested party may appeal to this
court, as in other cases."
Our Court again in the case of Wasatch Livestock
Loan Company vs. Nielsen et. al. 56 P. (2d) 613, said:
«From the foregoing provisions of the code, it is apparent that a creditor, after the death of his creditor,
is precluded from securing a specific lien on the property of the estate by attachment, execution, or othe!
legal process unless it be in the course provided by
the probate code; that is, claims presented and allowed have the same standing whether they be
founded upon a judgment or claims allowed and approved by the administrator and the court. In
either event the claimant must be content to wait
until the administrator of the estate acquires funds
with which to pay his claim." (Italics supplied.)
That a claim based on a money judgment must be
· presented to the administrator or executor is also the holding of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In the case of
Tucker vs. Gautier, 164 P. ( 2d) 613,
, the
Court said:
"Where the judgment is one for money only and the
judgment
debtor
dies
the procedure
to ofenforce
the Services
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judgment is that set forth in 58 0. S. 1941 Sec. 346,
which reads as follows:
'\Vhen any judgment has been rendered for or against
the testator or intestate in his life-time, no execution
shall issue thereon after his death, except:
1. In the case of the death of the judgment creditor,
upon the application of his executor or administrator,
or successor in interests.
2. In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the
judgment be for the recovery of real or personal
property, or the enforcement of a lien thereon.
A judgment against the decedent for the recovery of
money, must be presented to the executor or administrator, like any other claim. If the execution is
actually levied upon any property of the decedent before his death, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale must
account to the executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.'
It will be observed from the foregoing quotation that
it is made the mandatory duty of the judgment creditor who· own a judgment for money only to file a
claim therefor with the executor or administrator of
the estate of his deceased judgment debtor. Where
a judgment creditor does this and the claim is allowed the rights of the judgment creditor under his
judgment are preserved in every respect and where
the claim is disallowed he is thereupon relegated to
the procedure provided in 58.) S. 1941 Sec. 339; and
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any judgment thus obtained establishes his claim as
if it had been allowed by the executor and with the
same result. See 58 0., S. 1941 Sec. 345 and Morton
v. Adams, 124, Cal. 229, 56 0. 1038, 71 Am. St. Rep.
53 and In re Wiley's estate, supra."
Also the Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of
Cumberland and Liberty Mills, et. al. v. Keggin, 190 So.
492, said:
. ' "Section 123. Execution and levies prohibited. No
executions shall issue upon or be levied under any
judgment against a decedent or against the personal
representatives, nor shall any levy be made against
any property, real or personal, on the estate of a
decedent. Claims upon all judgments against the
decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other
claims against decedent
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section
shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of
mortgages, pledges or ·liens, or claims to specific property, real or personal ~ ~ ~'
Considering the two above quoted sections together,
it is clear that such enactments forbid executions to
be issued upon or levied under any judgment against
a decedent, and forbids any levy; to be made against
any property of the estate of the decedent; and commands that claims upon all judgments against the
decedent shall be filed in the same manner as other
claims against estate of decedents. The proviso to
section 23 of chapter 16103, added by; Section 8 of
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chapter 17171, includes pledges or liens, but in view
of the proceeding provisions, such proviso does not
include liens of judgment obtained as in this case
against the decedent in his life time."
Also see Grace Y. Lee, 57 S.W. (2d) 1095; First
Kational Bank of Bowie vs. Cone, et. al, 170 S.W.
- ( 2d) 782; Gulpine vs. Bower et al. 12 So. ( 2d.) 884.
THE PLAI~'fiFF FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT
HIS CLAL\1 HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE
AD:\IINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE A~D DENIED.
That is a necessary allegation would appear from the
provisions of 102-9-11, U. C. A., 1943, which says:
"No holder of any claim against any estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is first presented to the administrator or executor
(~,"
(1,

(1,

To this effect is the Oklahoma case of Fluke et. al vs.
Douglas 13 P. ( 2d) 210. The ·court said:
"The weight of the authority is, where the statutes
require presentation of a claim against an estate to
the personal representative, the petition or complaint
in an action on such claim must allege presentation,
and it has been held that this rule applies as well in
suits in equity as in actions at law. 24 C. J. 843.
The petition showing upon its face that the contract
sued upon was made after the enactment of section
12:34, supra, and failing to allege presentation of the
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claim to the administrator, there was no basis for the
finding or order relative to a deficiency judgment
against the estate."
The California Court in the case of Jacobson et. al. vs.
Mead, et. al55 P. (2d) 285, says:
"Furthermore, both counts of the plaintiffs' complaint
are wholly insufficient to state a cause of action
against the representatives of decedent's estate based
upon an implied contract to return money after rescission, for the reason that neither of them alleges that
a claim for the sum of $6,378, or any other sum, had
been presented to or filed against the estate of Mead
prior to the commenc~ment of the action. Probate
Code, Sec. 707, and Cf).Ses collected under 11a Cal.
Jur. 728. The complaint in so far as it was for a
money judgment, is obviously deficient in an essential
allegation which plaintiffs' cannot supply, and attention to which may be raised at any time."
Also see Delfelder vs. Farmer's State Bank of Riverton, et. al. 269 Pac. 418; Flynn et, al, vs. Driscoll, et.
a1. 223 Pac. 524.
THE LIEN OF THE JUDGMENT EXPIRED AND
CEASED TO BE A LIEN ON THE 28TH DAY OF
SEPTE~fBER, 1946.
Under section 104-30-15, U. C. A. 1943, the life of a
j,udgment:
"shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is
l?'reviously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the
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judgment is stayed on appeal by the executiOn of a
sufficient undertaking as provided by this code, in
which case the lien of the judgment ceases."
The limit of the duration of a lien is fixed at eight
years. It may be shortened by being satisfied or by the
execution of a sufficient undertaking on appeal. The
editors in 49 C.J.S. at page 947, section 492, says:
"In the absence of statutory authority the lien of the
judgment ordinarily may not be extended beyond the
period of time fixed by statutory regulations. In some
jurisdictions the statutes specify the causes for which
the life of the judgment lien shall be extended, and
such statutes should be strictly construed and the lien
ordinarly may not be extended except for the causes
and in the manner prescribed by the statute. A statutory provision that execution may be had on real
estate after the expiration of the statutory period for
which the lien continues by filing a notice, subscribed
by the sheriff, describio.g the judgment, the execution,
and the property levied on, does not extend the original lien of the judgment.
Revival of judgment distinguished. The right to revive a judgment is to be distinguished from the right
to keep the lien of the judgment alive that the
former is a right of action while the latter is not."
This court in the case of Smith vs. Schwartz, 21 U.
126, 60, Pac. 309, in speaking of the duration of a judgment
lien, stated:
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"The duration of judgment liens is dependent upon
the express will of the legislature, and the courts have
no power to extend them. Nor have they the right
when the language employed by the legislature is unambiguous, by con~truction, to make exceptions or
qualifications to meet the hardship of particular cases.
To do so would be a usurpation of legislative power.
In the case at bar the execution under which said real
estate was sold to Schwart was levied on said real
estate more than five years after the abstract of the
judgment rendered by the justice of the peace in
favor of Schwartz was filed in the office of the clerk
of the district court. At the latter date the judgment,
by virtue of the statute, became a lien on the real
estate and by virtue of the statute it expired five years
from that date."
Judgment liens are creatures of the statute. This
Court in Thompson vs. Avery, 11 Utah, 214, stated:
"Whatever right exists flows from the legislative department."
Again, this court in Smith vs. Schwartz, 21 Utah 126,
60 Pac. 309, with reference to the effect of the levy of an
execution during the life of the judgment lien said:
"It is well settled by the authorities that the levy of
an execution upo:o real estate during the time that
the judgment upon \\{lich the execution issued was
a lien upon the sa:r:ne, neither extends the lien of the
judgment, nor does it create a new lien upon the
property.
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In line with the foregoing Utah decisions, in an analogous situation the Courts also hold that the filing of a
complaint to foreclose a lien in a court of equity does not
extend the lien. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in the
case of Gardenshire vs. King, et, al37 S. W. 54,
said:
"Failure to sell within that time is as fatal to this lien
as if he had neglected altogether to take out his execution, nor is it extended beyond the statutory period
because the creditor by an agreement with his debtor
prevented himself from calling for an execution during the whole or the greater part of that time. This
is a misfortune which the law has made no provision
for nor can he extend or perpetuate it by resorting to
a bill in equity."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of
Newell v. Dart, et. al. 9 N. W. 732,
said:
"The plaintiff's right to the relief sought ·depends
entirely upon the existence of his judgment. This
action is wholly ancillary to the judgment and is in
aid of the execution issued thereon for the purpose
of reaching a certain chose in action of the judgment
debtor and having it applied in satisfaction of the
plaintiff's judgment. Hence, if plaintiff's judgment
is dead, his case falls to the ground. It is provided
by the statute •that a judgment shall survive and continue for a period of ten years and no longer.' General Statute 1878 C 66, Sec. 77. In the present case
this period expired June 3, 1880, and during the pentlency of this action. Hence, before the final trial and
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decision of this case and before judgment rendered
herein, plaintiff's judgment had ceased to exist either
as a cause of action or a lien unless kept alive by the
commencement and pendency of this action beyond
the statutory period of ten years.
We do not think the pendency of this action had any
such effect <~~< ~ ~"
In the case of Ruth vs. Wells, 83 N. W. 568,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota held, the syllabus in
the case is:
"A judgment lien cannot be prolonged by a court of
equity beyond the period fixed by the statute, though
the suit is commenced and at issue within such period,
but is not reached for trial until after the expiration
thereof. Courts must apply statutes enacted within
excepting any one from the operation therof, regardless of what they may think the legislature would have
done if certain conditions had been considered; and
when such statutes begin to run, judicial power cannot arrest their action.
The filing of a notice of action to enforce a judgment
lien cannot, where the lien has expired before the
action is tried, have any effect in extending the lien,
nor entitle the judgment creditor to enforce it in any
manner."
To the same effect is King vs. Hayes, et, al. 9 S.W.
(2d) 539; Rich vs. Cooper, 286 N.W. 383; Flag vs Flag,
58 N.W. 109; Lupton vs. Edmonton et. al 16 S. W. (2d)
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840; :McGinnis vs. Seibert et. al. 134 Pac. 396; I. Tager
Co. et. al. vs. :Mixon et. al. 157 S. 80; First National Bank
of ~1ontgomery vs. Powell, 155 So. 624.
The lien of judgment is not a cause of aCtion. See the
Georgia case of Tift et. al. vs. The Bank of Tipton et. al.
4 S. E. ( 2d) 495, which states:
"While, in a general sense perhaps, provisions after
jud~ent, for the purpose of enforcing it, for preserving its lien, rna y be considered as a continuance
of an action already brought, they cannot be consi~
ered as a bringing of an action ,o, ,o, ,o,
The right to revive it is to be distinguished from the
right to keep the line of the judgment in life. The
former is a right of action, the latter is not."
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF'S DEMURRER TO THE AMENDED ANSWER AND CROSS COMPLAINT OF HARRY
WALKER BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM.
The defendant, Han;y Walker, in addition to setting
forth in his amended answer that the plaintiff's money
judgment had never been presented to the administrator
of the estate of Gerald C. Walker, deceased, and that the
lien had expired on the 28th day of September, 1946, set
out that the plaintiff's judgrnent never attached as a lien
on the property in question as it had at all times constituted the decedent's homestead. Furthermore, that it
was distributed to the defendant under the provisions of
102-8-2 U. C. A. 1943, by a decree of summary distribution,
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and that it vested in him free and clear of plaintiff's purported judgment lien, and that in any event, the property
vested in him as a probate homestead.
The matters alleged in the amended answer were also
realleged in the defendant's cross complaint, and they
constituted the grounds for the relief prayed for. Thu;,
the issues involoved in th~ ruling of the Court on the
plaintiff's demurrers to the amended answer and cross
complaint can be discussed together. Furthermore, inasmuch as the question regarding the jurisdiction of a
court of equity to foreclose the plaintiff's purported lien,
and the failure of the plaintiff to present its money judgment to the administrator of the estate of the decedent,
and the expiration of the lien, have heretofore been discussed, they will not be repeated
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS THE
HOMESTEAD OF GERALD C. WALKER, DECEASED,
AND
PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT
NEVER ATTACHED AS A LIEN ON IT.
This Court had before it 38-0-1, U. C. A. 1943, supra,
which provides a homestead shall be exempt from a judgment lien except for taxes accruing and levied, lawful
mortgages and debts created for the purchase price thereof.
The decedent, Gerald C. Walker, at the date of his
death, was a resident of Smithfield, Utah, the head of
a family, and the property sought to be foreclosed by
the plaintiff was of a value of less than $2000.00.
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The foregoing_ statute specifically provides that a
judgment does not attach as a lien to exempt property a homestead. This is also the holding of the Utah decision
of Antelope Sheering Corale Company vs. Consolidated
Wagon & :\1achine Company, et. al. 180 Pac. 596.
As a collary to this where a judgment does not attach
in the lifetime of a judgment debtor it does not attach

upon his death. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the
case of Garrison vs. Carl, 166 Pac. 152, said:
«It follows that neither the lien of the grocer company
nor of \Velton could attach to these lots while occupied and used by :Mrs. Wade as a homestead, and
if they coul.d not then attach, neither can they attach
when she dies. This for the reason given in that
case where the homestead was sold - they no longer
belong to the judgment debtor. It also follows that
the judgments in question did not become liens upon
the homestead in question, although filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court pursuant to Rev.
laws 1910, Sec. 5148, and that the court erred in
rendering the judgment complained of. It is unnecessary to consider the remaining assignments o{
error."
This is also the holding of the Texas case of McDaniel
vs. ~Hiner, 19 S. W. ( 2d) 426. The Court said:
"From the plain provisions of those articles of the
Constitution and the provisions of Articles 3832, 3833
and 3839, Rev. St. 1925, which are declaratory of
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those constitutional provisions, it is manifest that the
lien asserted by reason of the first judgment against
G. W. McDaniel never attached to the property in
controversy or any part thereof either before or after
his death or the death of his wife."
Thus the plaintiff in this case is in no better position
than any other judgment creditor and in no event would
he come within the provisions of 102-9-11, U. C. A. 1943.

THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION VESTED IN THE
DEFENDANT, HARRY WALKER, AS HIS HOMESTEAD AND THUS IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
. PLAINTIFF'S PURPORTED JUDGMENT LIEN.
The defendant, Harry Walker, at the date of the death
of Gerald C. Walker, his father, was a minor of the age of
nineteen years. It was distributed to him by summary
distributions while still a minor and thus vested in him
free and clear of the plaintiff's lien, if any.
The court had before it 104-4-6, U. C. A. 1943, supra,
which provides for the setting apart to the surviving husband or wife and/or/minor children, a homestead to be
wholly exempt from the payment of the debts of the decedent, to be set apart on petition and notice at any time
after the return of the inventory.
Although it is true that the homestead was not set
apart to him by the probate court as such, it nevertheless
vested in him as a homestead as the value of the property
is less than the amount of $2000.00, and where the value
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of the property is less than the amount provided for as
a homestead, the setting apart of it is unnecessary. The
editors in :26 .-\m. Jur. page 56, section 89, says:
--~ECESSITY FOR SELECTION AS AFFECTED
BY A:\10UNT OF PROPERTY DEVOTED TO
HO~IESTEAD USE -If the amount of the property
which has been devoted to homestead use is less than
that which, by virtue of the statute, may be subject
to the right of homestead, no formal selection or
designation is necessary, the assumption being that
the claim of homestead will be asserted as to all of
the property. This is true regardless of whether there
is a provision in the statute prescribing the manner
of selecting the property to be held as exempt. The
n1le is the same where the widow or heirs claim the
benefit of the exemption, no formal selection or settapart being necessary if the property is of less value
than the amount allowed by the statute."

This is also the holding of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota. In the case of Cullen vs. Sullivan, 177 N. W. 176,
the Court said:
"In this case the surviving wife was sole heir and also
sole devisee under the will. In her case the decree
setting off the homestead was largely in idle ceremony
for the property w~ich was subject to the homestead
estate belonged to her absolutely as the heir and
devisee of her husband free and clear of any claims
of the creditors of her husband."
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To the same effect in the case of Green et. al. vs. Carr
County State aBnk, 7 S. W. (2d) 620 (Texas.) The Court
said:
"It is asserted that there was no proper order setting

apart the homestead for the use of the minor and that
the probate proceedings being regular and in form
vested the land in the appellee and the same may not
be attached collaterally. The order setting apart the
homestead for the use of minors operates merely upon
possession of the land as between the heirs. The
actual setting apart of the homestead in fact by the
probate court is not essential to the vesting thereto
in the heirs."

-..

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY TO
THE DEFENDANT, HARRY WALKER, IN SUMl\fARY DISTRIBUTION UNDER 102-8-2, U. C. A.,
1943, VESTED THE PROPERTY IN HIM FREE
AND CLEAR OF THE PLAINTIFF'S LIEN, IF
ANY.

The purpose of this statute was to grant a widow
and/ or minor children, an allowance sufficient to protect
them during the period immediately following the death
of the husband and to place them in a position pending
their social and economic adjustment where they would
not become a charge on the public. This was done at the
expense of the creditors, and a money judgment lien creditor should not be in any different position than other
creditors established in view of the fact that his lien did
not exist at common law and become one only by virtue
of a statute.
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Although this point wa\j1ot in issue i,{ljhe Utah case
of In Re. :\1ower's Estate, 93 f. 390, 73 Pat/!J67, the Court
said that 102-8-2 U. C. A. 1943 should be considered with
101-4-6 U. C. A. 1943. The latter section provides for a
probate homestead.
It would appear that is was the intent of the legisla-

ture that property distributed under 102-8-2, U. C. A. 1943
should be vested in the widow or minor children free and
clear of all encumbrances, for it therein specifically provided:
"The Court 1nay in its descretion exclude from the
distribution of the property so set apart and distributed, other than the homestead, any surviving wife,
husband or minor children having separate income."
I
is u* thn 1 u: IS DCC f& hbYlt
lj ll ii8 'iEii
In view of the reasons set forth the appellants respectfully submit that the judgment of the Court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL G. DAINES,
L. DELOS DAINES,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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